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Abstract
Not only after the failure of the Copenhagen climate conference 2009, border
carbon adjustment (BCA) has received growing attention in the climate policy de-
bate as a measure to combat “carbon leakage” and force non-abating countries to
tighter climate policies.
In this paper, we study the strategic interactions between international trade and
climate policy with a focus on the effectiveness of border measures. First, we analyze
the main principles of unilateral climate policy with international trade in a small
analytical model. Second, we examine welfare effects of WTO compatible carbon
import tariffs in a stylized numerical integrated assessment model with explicit trade
in commodities and analyze if BCA is a credible threat to force non-abating countries
to implement stricter climate policies.
We show that the terms of trade effects can, depending on trade patterns, ease
or boost the prisoners dilemma of mitigating greenhouse gases. We further demon-
strate that WTO conform BCA increases the effectiveness of climate policy and
forces trading partners to reduce emissions. But as the results of the numerical
model illustrate, welfare effects are depended on trade flows and are negative for
realistic parameter values.
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1 Introduction
After the failure of the Copenhagen climate conference 2009 the difficulty to coordinate
international climate policy became once more evident. Unilateral climate policy mea-
sures have several international dimensions, which makes it challenging to reach an joint
agreement.
First, the mitigation of greenhouse gases is a typical example of a public good. The
warming potential of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and its impact on the environment
is uncorrelated to the location of the emitter. Hence, if country A mitigates, country B
profits from the abatement effort by the same amount as A does.
Second, unilateral climate mitigation policies may rise production costs and prices of
carbon intensive goods, which may endanger domestic competitiveness in international
markets. Furthermore, this price increase might be an incentive for producers in coun-
tries with less tighten abatement policies to extend the production of carbon intensive
goods and hence increase emissions, counteracting the others abatement efforts.
Several studies estimated the size of this carbon leakage problem. The range in
estimations is large and uncertainties seem to be high. But most analyses conclude
that the efforts of Annex B countries, which have committed themselves to reduce GHG
emissions in the Kyoto Protocol, cause a “leakage” between 5% to 20% in Non-Annex B
countries (Metz, Davidson, Bosch, Dave, and Meyer 2007, Ch. 11).
As an approach to overcome this problem, trade policy instruments such as border
carbon adjustments (BCA) came into the debate. Such a border measure could be a
tax on imported carbon intensive products or a requirement for the exporting country
to buy domestic emission permits and to offset so carbon emissions incorporated in the
imported good. BCA should so counteract the negative competitiveness effects of GHG
mitigation policies by leveling the playing field between domestic and foreign producers
and force countries without substantial commitments to reduce GHG emissions. Early
contributions on border tax adjustments in general show that they guarantee trade
neutrality if goods are different taxed in different regions (Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1973).
In his seminal paper, Markusen (1975) applied such border measures on environmental
problems and showed that import tariffs are part of the optimal policy set for trans-
boundary pollution problems. Copeland (1996) has generalized this work for variable
abatement technologies. He concludes that the affected country should levy an tariff,
which varies with the pollution content of the imports. He further shows that even if
Foreign reduces pollution as a respond to Homes trade policy, Home should adhere to
the import tariff to maximize rents.
It also seems that such measures may increase the political enforceability of climate
policy and becoming even a conditio sine qua non in certain countries. In Europe, the
European Commission (EU) is working on a proposal for an internal minimum carbon
tax by updating the EU Energy Taxation Directive (2003/96/EC). In the United States,
The America Clean Energy and Security Act wants to force importers of carbon-intensive
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products to buy emission permits analogue to domestic producers.1 The US delegation
claimed also at the Copenhagen UN Climate Conference that such border measures
should be an integral component of a Post-Kyoto agreement. This may indeed increase
the size of the coalition in favor of an abatement agreement, as the work of Lessmann,
Marschinski, and Edenhofer (2009) and Barrett (1997) shows.
It remains the question if such border measures are conform with World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO) constraints. Ismer and Neuhoff (2007) argue that if carbon tax adjust-
ment at the border is based on the carbon content of the imported good as if it would
be produced with the best available production technology in the levying country, then
the measure should be compatible with WTO obligations. I.e. not the actual carbon
content of the imported commodity is taken into account as the assessment basis of the
tariff, which obviously reduces the efficiency of the instrument.
Alexeeva-Talebi, Lo¨schel, and Mennel (2008) show with a numerical general equilib-
rium model that border measures might improve the efficiency of EU’s climate policy
and increase the competitiveness of European energy-intensive industries. However, the
distinction between sectors covered by emission trading and a border tax adjustment
scheme and non-covered sectors has some problematic consequences. BCA causes a shift
in emissions and puts a higher burden on non-covered sectors. Since marginal abatement
costs in the non-covered sectors are higher, welfare effects are ambiguous. In an ear-
lier contribution Babiker and Rutherford (2005) studied the economic effects of border
measures under the targets of the Kyoto agreement. They show that the introduction
of BCA is welfare improving.
However, this studies differ in their setup from ours (and hence in their conclusions)
since they assume an exogenous given climate policy and then compare the effectiveness
of BCA. We use a different approach. Our starting point is an optimal unilateral climate
policy and we add BCA as an additional policy instrument for the regulator.
Under this assumptions we want to examine the question if such border carbon
measures are an effective instrument to minimize carbon leakage under optimal climate
policy and if BCA is a credible threat for the taxed countries to adopt stricter mitigation
policies. First, we illustrate the main principles behind the interaction of trade and
environmental policy in a small analytical model. For a quantitative assessment of
the effects and a comprehensive welfare analysis, we use then an extended version of
the RICE integrated assessment framework. We distinguish in our analysis between
two regions: Annex B and Non-Annex B of the Kyoto protocol, whereas both choose
their optimal unilateral climate policy. The model allows us to extend the effects of
explicit trade in commodities on optimal climate policy and vice versa in an integrated
assessment framework.
The analysis shows that BCA is effective in combating leakage and improves the ef-
1The America Clean and Energy Security Act plans to introduce an GHG emission trading scheme
for the US industry. The bill was passed by the House of Representatives on June 26, 2009 and is still
in consideration in the Senate.
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fectiveness of Annex B’s unilateral abatement policies. But due to existing trade pattern,
BCA has a negative effect on the terms of trade under optimal unilateral climate poli-
cies and hence causes relevant welfare costs for Annex B. Therefore, such measures are
not obvious a credible threat to force other regions to implement stricter environmental
policies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the set up of
the analytical model, provides in sections 2.1 to 2.3 the results of the analytical model,
and discusses the effectiveness of carbon tariffs in section 2.4. Section 3 explains the
numerical model. The results of the numerical simulation are provided in section 4.
Finally we conclude.
2 A Small Analytical Model
In this section, we set up an illustrative model to analyze the main characteristics of
climate policy in open economies and explain the mechanisms behind carbon leakage, the
efficiency of border carbon adjustment as measure against leakage, and the opportunity
to manipulate terms of trade with climate policy. The knowledge gained from this
exercises will help to understand the rationale behind the results of the numerical model,
presented in section 3.
We are interested in the interaction between two interconnected regions. The two
main blocks of countries in climate politics are the Annex B countries (mainly members
of OECD), which have binding mitigation targets under the Kyoto protocol, and Non-
Annex B countries without binding targets. We refer to this two groups and abbreviate
Annex B (Non-Annex B) with A (N).
Figure 1 explains the main characteristics of the model. The two regions A and N
are linked through two channels. First, emissions generate a negative trans-boundary
externality and mitigation is a public good, which creates an incentive to free ride on
the others abatement efforts. Second, the two regions are linked through trade in goods
and border measures might affect this flow of goods.
We focus our analysis on two types of commodities: A carbon-intensive, dirty good
and a clean good, which is vulnerable to climate change. We suppose that the production
of the carbon-intensive good causes an externality and affects the production of the
vulnerable good.
Examples for goods produced in the carbon-intensive sectors are the production of
energy with fossil fuel, cement or steel. All this sectors are responsible for a significant
amount of CO2 emissions from economic activities. The output of the carbon-intensive
good in region i ∈ {A,N} can be denoted as
Di = D(ei), (1)
where ei are the GHG emissions of region i.2 As for any other input factor we assume
2Although emissions are an undesirable joint product of production, we could imagine the input of
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Figure 1: The main characteristics of the analytical model. We distinguish between two
regions which are connected through the use of a common public good and international
trade in two commodities.
decreasing marginal returns of emissions: ∂Di∂ei > 0 and
∂2Di
∂e2i
< 0.3
The CO2 emissions from producing the carbon-intensive good, regardless in which
region, affect the state of the climate system and causes a degradation of environmental
quality. The second sector, which produces the clean, affected good, uses environmental
services as an input and has hence to cope with productivity losses from GHG, emitted
by the carbon-intensive sector. Examples are sectors such as as agriculture and forestry,
which are negatively affected by higher probabilities of droughts and increasing climate
variability as consequences of climate change (Parry, Canziani, Palutikof, van der Linden,
and Hanson 2007).
The production of the clean, affected good Ci in region i can be denoted as:
Ci = C(E(ei, ej)), (2)
with i 6= j. The output of the affected good sector depends negatively on GHG
emissions from both regions, neglecting other input factors. As it is the case for GHG,
we assume that emissions are perfect substitutes in their damage potential, regardless
of their origin, i.e. E(ei, ej) = eN + eA. From the discussion above follows that ∂Ci∂E < 0.
We further assume increasing marginal damages with respect to emissions, ∂
2Ci
∂E2
< 0.
The assumption on increasing marginal damages due to climate change is consistent
with most empirical findings on the climate vulnerability of societies (e.g Stern (2007)
and Nordhaus and Boyer (2000)). Furthermore, it influences the production possibility
frontier (PPF) of the regional economies. As shown by Baumol and Bradford (1972),
market externalities might often cause non-convex production sets, which aggravates
the application of standard microeconomic tools.4 The above discussed properties of the
production function ensure that the production set is convex.
emissions as the use of environmental services to deposit the joint product.
3Note that if ∂Di
∂ei
>
∂Dj
∂ej
, region i has a more carbon efficient production technology than j.
4In the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, non-convexity is one of the required conditions.
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Proposition 1 Despite of negative market externalities the production set is still con-
vex, if we assume that ∂Di∂ei > 0 and
∂2Di
∂e2i
< 0 in the carbon-intensive sector and ∂Ci∂ei < 0
and ∂
2Ci
∂E(ei)2
< 0 in the affected good sector.
The proof for proposition 1 can be found in Appendix A.1.
The value of a region’s total production can be denoted by a national income function
Gi = p ·D(ei) + C(E(ei, ej)) with i 6= j, (3)
where p denotes the world market price of the carbon-intensive good. The world
market price of the affected good is the nume´raire. For low levels of foreign emissions, Gi
is humped shaped, since marginal benefits from emissions are relatively large compared
to the damages. Gi is increasing until marginal benefits are equal to the marginal
damages.
Both regions simultaneously choose their optimal climate policy. We define optimal
climate policy as the level of emissions, which maximizes welfare within the region.
The climate policy regulator of a region issues ei emission permits to carbon-intensive
producers, such that regional welfare is maximized. Or in other words: The regulator
maximizes the indirect utility function Vi with respect to the number of emission permits
ei:
max
ei
V (p,Gi(p, ei)). (4)
Then the following first order condition has to hold for an utility maximum:
∂Vi
∂ei
=
∂V
∂p
∂p
∂ei
+
∂V
∂Gi
[
∂p
∂ei
Di + p
∂Di
∂ei
+
∂Ci
∂E
∂E
∂ei
]
= 0. (5)
Following Roy’s Identity, the domestic demand for the carbon-intensive goodH(p,Gi)
is defined as H(p,Gi) ≡ −
∂V
∂p
∂V
∂Gi
. So we can rearrange equation (5) to
p
∂Di
∂ei
+
∂Ci
∂E
∂E
∂ei
+
∂p
∂ei
Xi = 0, (6)
whereas Xi denotes carbon-intensive net exports of region i. Condition (6) represents
the standard equimarginal Pigouvian principle, plus a Terms of Trade (ToT) term. If
the domestic demand for the carbon-intensive good is smaller than production, Xi is
positive. Thus, assuming that ∂p∂ei < 0, a net exporting region has to take into account
that an increase in emissions deteriorates Terms of Trade.
Before discussing the effectiveness of border carbon measures, we take a closer look
on international spillover effects of unilateral climate policy. To do so, we distinguish
between three different cases. In the first case, we assume that both Annex B and Non
Annex B are small open economies, i.e. commodity prices are exogenous and independent
from policy decisions for both regions. In the second case we slacken this assumption
for Annex B and suppose that A’s policy decisions affects commodity prices, which is a
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necessary assumption to study leakage. In the third case, we assume that both regions
are large open economies and Terms of Trade effects are taken into account for optimal
policy responses.5
We assume that the different countries, which belong to one group, act as homoge-
neous entity. We focus the analysis on responses of Non-Annex B on marginal reductions
of Annex B’s GHG emissions. This should reflect the current debate about stricter en-
vironmental policies in Annex B countries and the respective carbon leakage effect in
Non-Annex B countries.
2.1 Two Small Open Economies - The Free Rider Effect
As described above, both regions take prices as exogenously given. Therefore, ∂p∂ei = 0
and the first order condition for Non-Annex B ’s optimal emission policy in equation
(6) is simplifying to p∂DN∂eN +
∂CN
∂E
∂E
∂eN
= 0. Hence, trade considerations play no part and
only the effect of the trans-boundary externality matters. Then N ’s optimal response
to a marginal change in A’s emissions is
∂eN
∂eA
=
−∂2CN
∂E2
p∂
2DN
∂e2N
+ ∂
2CN
∂E2
< 0. (7)
The nominator shows the change in marginal damages if A abates an additional unit
of emissions. The denominator shows the change in N ’s marginal profits from a change
in own emission. Crucial for the analysis is the sign of expression (7). We find that the
sign is negative. If Annex B countries raise its mitigation efforts, Non-Annex B will emit
more GHG.
Proposition 2 Neglecting price effects, mitigation in Annex B countries causes an in-
crease of emissions in Non-Annex B countries. Emissions are strategic substitutes.
Proof: The numerator is positive by definition. The two terms in the denominator
are negative for positive prices. Thus, the denominator is negative and so the sign of
equation (7). 
The negative relationship between the emissions of both regions can be considered as
classical free-rider problem. Increasing mitigation efforts in Annex B decrease marginal
damages and thus increase the incentive to raise emissions in Non-Annex B (and vice
versa).
Note that gradient of the response function is between -1 and 0. N never increases
emissions by more than A’s abatement. Global emissions are not increased in the margin
due to the free rider effect.6
5The terms “small” respective “large” open economies are eventually misleading, since output-levels
and the relative size of the externality do not change over the cases. “Small”and “large” differ only
in the way in which Terms of Trade effects will be taken into consideration for climate policy making.
However, since these terms are often used in this context, we stick to this terminology.
6It is obvious that the resulting equilibrium not maximizes social welfare. A social planner would take
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2.2 One Small and one Large Open Economy - Leakage
As seen in the section above the free-rider effect counteracts Annex B’s mitigation efforts,
if we neglect effects from climate policy on commodity prices. We release now this
assumption for A, so that ∂p∂eA = 0 only by accident. Now N ’s optimal response if A
marginally reduces emissions is now as follows:
∂eN
∂eA
=
−
(
∂2CN
∂E2N
+ ∂p∂eA
∂DN
∂eN
)
p∂
2DN
∂e2N
+ ∂
2CN
∂E2
. (8)
Compared to the reaction as derived in the small open economy configuration,
an additional term appears in the response expression. The second term in the nu-
merator indicates the effect of changing world market prices of the carbon intensive
goods due to mitigation in Annex B on marginal emission benefits in the Non-Annex
B. From the international market clearance condition for the carbon-intensive good∑
iH(p,G(ei, ej))−
∑
iDi(p, ei) = 0, we can show that:
∂p
∂eA
=
∂YA
∂eA
− σθ
(
∂GA
∂eA
+ ∂GN∂eA
)
(ε− η)Z < 0, (9)
whereas σ denotes the income elasticity of the demand of the carbon-intensive good,
ε is the price elasticity of the demand and η stands for the price elasticity of the supply
of carbon-intensive goods. θ describes the value share of carbon-intensive goods in the
utility function and Z denotes the respective market size. It easy to show that equation
(9) has a negative sign, ∂p∂eA < 0.
7 Emission taxes or emission trading schemes raise the
production costs and prices of carbon-intensive goods.
Note that elasticities play a crucial role for the strenghtness of the price change and
hence for leakage. Higher demand elasticities cause lower price changes, whereas higher
supply elasticities obviously leads to larger price effects.
A’s emission reduction raises the price of carbon-intensive commodities. This leads
to larger marginal profits, which induces leakage. Hence, relative to equation (7) in the
first case, the nominator is larger, so that, compared to the first case, N responds more
vigorously on mitigation in A.
Figure 2 illustrates the previous findings. Because of decreasing marginal damages,
Non-Annex B increases emissions if Annex B intensifies mitigation efforts, since N profits
from A’s contribution to a better climate state. Further, if mitigation in A increases
the world market price of carbon-intensive goods, N has additional incentives to raise
emissions, since it becomes more profitable to produce carbon-intensive goods.
Proposition 3 If Annex B’s abatement efforts affect the price of the carbon-intensive
good on the world market, Non-Annex B will raise emissions by more than in the absence
into account that emissions affect both regions. Hence, from the Samuelson condition on the optimal
provision of public goods, the first order condition for a social optimum would be pi
∂Di
∂ei
= −Pr ∂Cr∂E ∂E∂ei .
7The derivation of expression (9) can be found in the Appendix A.2.
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of those induced price effects. Leakage increases the negative response of N ’ on A’s
abatement efforts.
Proof: Since ∂p∂eA < 0 as shown in the Appendix and
∂DN
∂eN
> 0 by definition, ex-
pression (8) is always smaller than expression (7). Hence, mitigation in A increases the
incentive to raise emissions by N more than in the first case. 
MD MD'MB MB''
'Freeride'
 Effect
Emissions of i'Leakage'
 Effect
Figure 2: If region i is increasing the world market price of the carbon-intensive good by
mitigating, climate policy in region i leads to an increase of region j emissions because
of the free-rider effect and the leakage effect.
Note that if ∂p∂eA
∂DN
∂eN
> p∂
2DN
∂e2N
, i.e. the increase in marginal benefits of emissions due
to the increase in prices is greater than the change in marginal benefits due to increasing
emissions, expression (8) can get smaller than -1. Total emissions may increase due to
a marginal reduction in the North.8
We define now the leakage rate, i.e. marginal change in N emission due to marginal
changes in A abatement policy, induced by commodity price change, LN = ∂p∂eA
∂eN
∂p .
Thus, the leakage rate denotes the marginal change of the price due to a decrease of
emissions in the Annex B times the marginal increase of emissions in Non-Annex B due
to the price change and so we get for LN :
LN =
−∂DN∂eN
(
∂DA
∂eA
− σθ
(
∂GA
∂eA
+ ∂GN∂eA
))
(
p∂
2DN
∂e2N
+ ∂
2CN
∂E2
)
(ε− η)Z
. (10)
Equation (10) indicates that larger marginal profits of emissions (∂YN∂eN ) in the Non-
Annex B cause more leakage. And the higher elasticities of demand the smaller is the
leakage rate. And obviously the more vulnerable N ’s C sector is, the lower is leakage.
We see as well that increasing market sizes reduced leakage.
As several authors have shown (e.g. Kennedy (1994)), imperfect competition causes
a strategic interaction of environmental policies between countries. In the presence of
8But such an equilibrium might be unstable.
9
leakage have countries an incentive to set CO2 taxes below the Pigouvian level to capture
additional rents. This environmental dumping effect additionally tempers the ability of
climate policy instruments to internalize the pollution problem.
In the next section we examine this terms of trade effects of unilateral climate policy
more in detail.
2.3 Two Large Open Economies - Take Terms of Trade into Account
In contrast to the case before, where Non-Annex B only responds to the price effect
caused by mitigation in Annex B, we take now changing terms of trade into consideration
in the formulation of the own climate policy. Climate policy is no longer only a tool to
internalize externalities from CO2 emissions, but might serve as device to manipulate
Terms of Trade.
If we let the two regions trade and assume that both regions are no longer price
takers, the first order condition (6) holds for both regions. Therefrom we derive again
the optimal response of N on an marginal emission reduction in A.
∂eN
∂eA
=
−(∂2CN
∂E2
+ ∂p∂eA
∂DN
∂eN
+ ∂p∂eN
∂XN
∂eA
+ ∂
2p
∂eN∂eA
XN )
p∂
2DN
∂e2N
+ ∂
2CN
∂ES
+ ∂p∂eN
∂DN
∂eN
+ ∂
2p
∂e2N
XN + ∂p∂eN
∂XN
∂eN
. (11)
Now, effects on terms of trade and net exports play a crucial role for responses on each
others abatement decisions. The region which net-exports the carbon-intensive good has
an interest in high relative prices of this good. Let us assume that Non-Annex B is a
net-exporter of carbon-intensive goods and Annex B marginally reduces his emissions.
As we have seen in the section above the abatement effort of A increases the carbon-
intensive good price. Since N is a net-exporter of this good, As effort improves the
Terms of Trade of N . Therefore N has only limited incentives to expand production of
the carbon-intensive commodity (and raise emissions), since this lowers the price and
deteriorates Terms of Trade.
The fourth term in the numerator of expression 11, ∂
2p
∂eN∂eA
XN shows how the
marginal Terms of Trade change if A changes emissions. For a net-exporting coun-
try this term is positive and reduces the numerator relative to cases, which do not
take into account Terms of Trade effects. The two additional terms in the denominator
∂2p
∂e2N
XN + ∂p∂eN
∂XN
∂eN
are both positive for net-exporting countries. Hence the denominator
increases. Take the two effects together and we observe that a net exporter of carbon-
intensive goods responds with less large increase in emissions if the other region abates
one unit of emissions.
The sign of expression (11) is no longer clear by definition. If the responding country
is a net-exporter of carbon-intensive goods and ToT considerations dominate the leakage
and the free rider effect, a marginal reduction emission reduction by the opponent can
cause a reduction in emissions by the acting region. The opposite holds if N is a net-
importer of carbon-intensive goods. In this case will N further increase emissions to
reduce the price of carbon-intensive goods to improve ToT.
10
It is not a new result that environmental policy is used to alter Terms of Trade.
Krutilla (1991) showed that an export reduction due to environmental policy generates
a monopolistic surplus on the reduced exports volume and so it might be in the interest
of the regulator to emit less than the Pigouvian level.
But besides establishing unilateral climate policies and exploit the trade effects of
these policies, the climate policy regulator has also the possibility to explicitly target
foreign emissions by imposing a tariff on carbon-intensive imports. We discuss the effects
of such an instrument in the next section.
2.4 Border Carbon Adjustment to Combat Leakage
Climate policy instruments only target domestic polluters. But climate change is a
global scale externality and GHG mitigation is a public good. As shown in the sections
2.2 and 2.3, such problems may be enforced through carbon leakage and, depending on
trade patterns, Terms of Trade effects.
A measure to face carbon leakage are border taxes on the import of carbon-intensive
goods. They raise the consumer price for carbon-intensive imports, reduce demand for
those goods and hence foreign production, which goes along with less foreign emissions.
In this section, we analyze the effect of border carbon adjustment on carbon-intensive
goods and discuss if BCA has the potential to increase the efficiency of unilateral climate
policy in open economy regimes.
Among lawyers it is heavily debated if border carbon adjustment is conform with
WTO rules. Ismer and Neuhoff (2007) propose that the implementation of BCA is
feasible under certain conditions. They argue that all products of a certain sector,
regardless of the production method, have to be considered as homogeneous. Hence,
to not violate the non-discriminatory principle of Art. III GATT, the levying country
is only allowed to take the lowest GHG charges incurred by any domestic producer.
This means that the calculation basis for the level of BCA is the amount GHG emitted
during the production process as if the good would be produced with the best available
technology in the implementing country.
Since the representation of production technologies is as simple as possible in our
model, we do not distinguish between different production methods within a region,
hence we simply assume that the tax rate by which an imported carbon-intensive good
is levied, is based on the domestic carbon intensity. In contrast to a pollution content
tariff as in Copeland (1996), the tariff level does not depend on the carbon content of
the imported good itself and the production technology abroad. This reduces the policy
efficiency of the tariff, since abatement efforts of the exporters do not directly reduce
the tariff. But it should represent an WTO conform implementation as it was pointed
out by Ismer and Neuhoff (2007).
For the analysis of BCA we concentrate for the sake of simplification on the second
case discussed above in which only Annex B’s policy actions influence prices, whereas the
Non-Annex B takes them as given. We extend then the model by Annex B’s imposition
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of a border tax τA on imported carbon-intensive goods. Let us again assume that Non-
Annex B countries are net exporters of carbon-intensive goods. The exports to Annex
B are taxed on the border. The first order condition for the optimal emission level in
Non-Annex is now as follows:
p
∂HN
∂eN
+ (p− τA(eA))∂XN
∂eN
+
∂CN
∂E
∂E
∂eN
= 0. (12)
∂HN
∂eN
denotes the change in domestic demand for carbon-intensive goods in Non-
Annex B if own emissions marginally change, ∂XN∂eN denotes the respective change in
net exports. The implementation of BCA in A affects the first order condition of N :
Marginal profits from emissions are now split up in benefits from domestic consumption
and in profits from exports. The higher the foreign tariff, the smaller the marginal profits
from carbon-intensive exports and hence from emissions.
A small rearrangement of the expression 12 and an exploiting of the implicit function
theorem leads to the following response of N on a marginal reduction of A’s emissions:
∂eN
∂eA
=
−
(
∂2CN
∂E2N
+ ∂p∂eA
∂YN
∂eN
− ∂τA∂eA
∂XN
∂eN
− τ ∂2XN∂eN∂eA
)
p∂
2DN
∂e2N
+ ∂
2CN
∂E2
− τA ∂2XN∂e2N
(13)
We detect three additional terms in the marginal response expression 13, which are
of importance: (i) ∂τA∂eA
∂XN
∂eN
is the tax rate effect of the border measure. If A marginally
reduces his emissions, A’s carbon-intensive industry produces more carbon-efficiently.
Since the assessment basis of the tax rate depends on A’s production technology, τA is
increasing. This reduces the profits from N ’s carbon-intensive net-exports and hence
the incentive to respond with an expansion of GHG emissions. (ii) The term τ ∂
2XN
∂eN∂eA
captures changes in net-exports due to a decrease in A’s emissions. A reduction in A’s
emission affects only the demand side of the net-export balance and is only of second-
order importance. We ignore therefore this effect for the further analysis and draw
our attention on additional terms in the denominator. If we again neglect demand-side
effects, we can state τA ∂
2XN
∂e2N
= τ ∂
2YN
∂e2N
. It now becomes obvious that the border measure
reduces the marginal profits from emissions for the Non-Annex B countries and hence
reduces negative leakage incentives.
Proposition 4 Assume that N is a net-exporter of carbon-intensive goods and that
changes in climate policy do not affect the demand side of the trade balance. Then
border carbon adjustment measures reduce the negative response of N on a marginal
change in A’s GHG emissions.
If we neglect demand-side effects on the trade-balance for carbon-intensive good, then
τ ∂
2XN
∂eN∂eA
= 0, ∂τA∂eA
∂XN
∂eN
= ∂τA∂eA
∂YN
∂eN
> 0, and τA ∂
2XN
∂e2N
< 0. This reduces the numerator
and enlarges the denominator compared to the marginal response expression 8. Hence,
in a regime, where A imposes border taxes on N ’s carbon-intensive exports, N responds
to a marginal reduction in A’s emissions with a less pronounced emission increase than
12
in absence of border measures. 
The nominator in equation (13) on the right hand side shows the limitation of BCA
to combat leakage. While mitigation in Annex B influences the world market price and
hence the total production of the carbon-intensive goods in Non-Annex B ( ∂p∂eA
∂YN
∂eN
), the
import tariff affects only N ’s net exports (∂τA∂eA
∂XN
∂eN
). Hence, the bigger the export share
of the N ’s carbon-intensive production, the more effective is BCA.
To examine full general equilibrium effects and to get a quantitative assessment of the
effects, we turn now our attention to the numerical model. Annex B profits from a better
environmental quality, because the incentive of Non-Annex B to increase emissions is
smaller than without import tariffs. But at the same time, A suffers from terms of trade
changes, depending on trade patters. BCA is only a credible threat, if N is convinced
that the A profits in terms of welfare from the measure. However, welfare effects are
not captured in the analytical model. To answer the question of the credibility of WTO
conform BCA measures and examine a more detailed representation of the problem, we
analyze a parametrized numerical integrated assessment model in the next section.
3 An Integrated Assessment Model with International Trade
in Commodities
To gain more accurate evidence about welfare effects of BCA and to assess quantitatively
trade flows and optimal climate policies, we need to parametrize the generic model
of section 2. The analytical model has some shortcomings since it does not account
for the dynamics of global climate change and neglects other production factors. And
since the production and utility functions in the analytical model are kept general,
we can not characterize the exact equilibrium outcome. For this reason we analyze
the findings from above in a numerical integrated assessment model (IAM). An IAM
combines a simple mathematical representation of the global carbon cycle with an general
equilibrium representation of the economy. We require a model, which is able to represent
optimal climate policy under second-best solutions (border taxes) with regional and
sectoral disaggregation and international trade in goods.
Most policy optimizing IAMs are casted as nonlinear programs. Prominent examples
are the Dynamic Integrated Climate Economy (DICE) model by Nordhaus (1991) and the
Model for Evaluating Regional and Global Effects of GHG reduction policies (MERGE)
by Manne, Mendelsohn, and Richels (1995).
Nonlinear programs have the disadvantage that the first-order conditions only corre-
spond to equilibrium conditions where the shadow prices of the constraints coincide with
market prices. Since our examination of BCA induces a second-best equilibrium other
approaches are necessary.9 Bo¨hringer, Lo¨schel, and Rutherford (2007) have developed
9Applying Negishi-weighted objective functions and sequential joint maximization algorithms (see
e.g. Rutherford (1992)) may relax this so-called integrability problem. However, convergence to an
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a mixed complementarity formulation of DICE, which overcomes these problems and
allows to deal straightforward with the representation of several regions and inefficient
market allocations. A second advantage of the reformulation by Bo¨hringer, Lo¨schel, and
Rutherford (2007) is the possibility to run the climate and economic sub-models on dif-
ferent time scales. This allows to cope with the moderate speed of climate dynamics on
the one hand and a higher degree of complexity in the economic system over a shorter,
more policy-relevant time-horizon on the other hand. Due to this properties we use this
modified, reformulated version of DICE and add to the model a multi-regional repre-
sentation of the economy with explicit trade in commodities. To our knowledge, this
is the first policy optimization IAM which incorporates explicitly international trade in
commodities.
3.1 The Structure of the Numerical Model
As in the theoretical analysis above we divide the world into two regions, the Annex B
countries and the Non-Annex B countries.10 And similar as well, two different products
are produced: carbon-intensive goods such as coal, oil and chemicals, and a non-carbon-
intensive, clean, good, which enfolds sectors such as agriculture and services.11
Both goods are produced with the two factors capital and labor, which are mobile
across sectors but not across regions. The two commodities can be traded on interna-
tional markets. To model sectoral trade flows in both directions (a difference to the
analytical model, but obviously closer to the reality), we use the Armington (1968) as-
sumption, proposing that foreign and domestic goods are not perfect substitutes. The
sectoral Armington goods are then aggregated to the regional gross GDP Qr,t in period
t of region r.12
As in our theoretical model presented above, we suppose that GHG emissions,Er,t,
are linked to the production of carbon-intensive goods, OD,r,t only.
Er,t = φr,t(1−Υr,t)OD,r,t, (14)
whereas as in DICE φr,t denotes the exogenous emission-output ratio13 and Υr,t is
the endogenously chosen emission control rate. But reducing emissions is costly, so the
abatement costs can be denoted as
ABr,t = γ1rΥ
γ2r
r,t, (15)
where γ1r and γ
2
r are the parameters of the abatement cost function.
14
The state of the climate system then depends on the accumulation of emissions in the
atmosphere. Our climate sub-model is similar to the model used in DICE and is described
equilibrium is not established.
10Appendix A.5 shows the regional aggregation.
11Appendix A.6 shows the full sectoral aggregation.
12All elasticities of substitution are depicted in Appendix A.8.
13Appendix A.9 presents the energy-technology more in detail.
14See Appendix A.8 for parameter values.
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Figure 3: The main properties and characteristics of the numerical integrated assessment
model.
in Appendix A.7 in detail. Changes in the state of the climate system then causes impacts
on the economy. Other than in the theoretical model the externality affects the economy
as a whole and not only one sector. To calibrate the impact function, the same data as
in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) is used and rearranged due to the differences in regional
aggregation. The damage representation of the numerical model is explained in detail
in Appendix A.4.
Climate damages Dr,t and expenditures for mitigation efforts ABr,t reduce the gross
output of the economy,
Yr,t = (1−ABr,t)Qr,t −Dr,tYr,t. (16)
The remaining net output may be used for consumption, investment or as interme-
diate good in the production of the two commodities. For an detailed explanation about
the production structure of the model see Schenker (2009). Figure 3 gives an overview
about the structure of the numerical model.
The representative agents choose now the factor allocation, trade flows and abate-
ment efforts, such that the own regional welfare is maximized. I.e. they both choose a
policy which is optimal given the others decisions. To mirror the current state in inter-
national climate politics, we assume that Annex B chooses the optimal climate policy
with respect to future costs of climate change, whereas Non-Annex B does not contain
GHG emissions at all.
To assess BCA, we will now compare the outcome of two different policy cases: In
15
the first case, the optimal climate policy is chosen in the absence of border measures.
In the second case, Annex B countries implements a WTO-conform BCA measure on
imported carbon-intensive goods from Non-Annex B.
4 Results from Numerical Exercises
While the Annex B countries committed themselves to reduce GHG emission by 5.2
percent until 2012 compared to the 1990 level, the Non-Annex B countries have no
constraints regarding GHG emission constraints.
To reduce the resulting leakage from Annex B’s climate policy, the policy regulator in
Annex B imposes in the second scenario a border tax on carbon-intensive imports from
Non-Annex B. We argue that the implementation of border tax measure is conform with
WTO constraints. The policy regulator has now a second instrument at hand to affect
the future state of the climate. Note that these two instruments interact with each other.
This is also the main difference to the situation in the real world, where first a decision
was made about the climate policy target and then the instruments were chosen to fulfill
this targets. We do it the other way around and compare the outcomes of the optimal
policies with a different number of instruments at hand. It is clear that the assessment
of a policy depends strongly on the chosen baseline case.
4.1 Optimal Climate Policy without Border Carbon Adjustment
Figure 4 illustrates the results of our baseline scenario. The top left panel of the figure 4
shows the development of GDP for both regions. In the year 2010, the two regions start
with almost the same level of GDP. But Non-Annex B grows faster and has in the year
2100 a nearly three times higher GDP than Annex B. One reason for this development
are the higher exogenous population growth rates of the Non-Annex B countries. The
other reason is illustrated in the panel in the top right of that figure: Non-Annex B firms
can expand the production of carbon intensive goods with less costs than producers in
Annex B, since they are not bounded by an emission reduction target and will therefore
emit more CO2. As a result, the mean global surface temperature increases by 5 ◦C until
2100 and the climate damages in the Annex B countries amount to over 5% of GDP in
2100 (see panel in the bottom right of figure 4).
The graph in the bottom left of Figure 4 shows the price of CO2 emissions in the
Annex B countries. The price of a tCO2-equiv. raises from 6 $ in 2010 to 22 $ in 2100.15
Since the Non-Annex B countries do not have a mitigation policy at all, the price of
emissions in the Non-Annex B countries is zero.
But despite of the advantage of less regulation in Non Annex B’s carbon-intensive
sector, Annex B stays a net exporter of those goods. The higher capital intensity in the
carbon-intensive production ensures that although the additional regulation costs, Annex
15This regional social cost of carbon is in line with results from other assessments based on the RICE
(see Tol (2005))
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Figure 4: Results of the baseline scenario. Since the Non-Annex B countries neglect
climate damages, Non-Annex B CO2 emissions grow strongly.
B still has an comparative advantage in the carbon intensive sector. Since Annex B has
the more efficient technology regarding emissions in the carbon-intensive sector, this has
positive effects for the environment. But as we learned from the theoretical analyis in
section 2.3, the regulator will in case of beeing net exporter of the carbon-intensive good
set the emission price above the Pigouvian level to stint the supply of this goods and
generate additional rents. So note that we in our economy two market failours occur:
On the one hand are GHG emissions responsible for trans-boundary adverse economic
impacts, which were not taken into account by the climate policy regulator. On the
other hand, commodity markets are imperfect and the regulator can use climate policy
instruments to generate generate rents.
In the next section we will give the climate policy regulator an additional instrument
at hand. To combat carbon leakage a border measure will imposed.
4.2 Optimal Climate Policy with Border Carbon Adjustment
The difference between emissions prices in both regions is the basis to calculate the
border carbon measure. To minimize leakage, reestablish competitivness of domestic
producers of the carbon-intensive good in the domestic market and to level the playing
field between producers of those goods in both regions, Annex B will impose a border
tax adjustment. But since today international trade is organized along rules based on
international law, the implementation of such measures is limited.
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The representation of technologies in the our model is very simplified. We distinguish
only between two different ways to produce the carbon-intensive good and we further
assume that the North has the more carbon efficient production method. Then the level
of the border carbon adjustment on dirty good imports from Non-Annex B into Annex
B, τA,t, is calculated as follows:
τA,t = (peA,t − peN,t)
EA,t
OD,A,t
, (17)
whereas (peA,t − peN,t) is the difference in prices of emissions between Annex B and
Non Annex B and EA,tOD,A,t is the GHG content of one carbon-intensive good, produced
with Annex B technology. Obviously it would be more efficient to use the real carbon
intensity of Annex B’s import, but apart from the potential non-conformity of such a
scheme with WTO rules, monitoring the actual carbon content of imports would also be
a major challenge.
Figure 5 shows the main consequences of such a BCA implementation by Annex
B. As can be seen in the panel in the top right and as proposed by the theoretical
analysis the border measure does the job and causes a reduction in foreign emissions.
But the additional goal of the tariff to reestablish competitivness in the carbon-intensive
good sector is succesfull as well and leads to an increase of domestic emissions.16 The
production of carbon-intensive goods in the Annex B countries increases due to the
import tariff, since BCA rises the comparative advantage of dirty good production in
Annex B. The Non-Annex B countries decrease the production of those goods. For
the clean goods, the effects are vice versa: The Non-Annex B countries increase the
production of clean goods and the Annex B countries decrease the production of these
goods.
Since the Annex B produces carbon-intensive goods more emission-efficently, overall
emissions are reduced. This leads to less climate damages in the Annex B countries.
Compared to the damages in the baseline scenario, the damages in the Annex B countries
are reduced by 0.5% due to the reduction in emissions induced by the border measure.
To study the efficency of the border measure more in detail we constructed a trun-
cated one-region version of the original model where the prices and quantities of the
other region were exogenously given and examined how the considered region responds
on marginal changes in the other regions values. As in the theoretical model we focus our
analyis on the leakage rate in the Non-Annex B region which is defined as ∂pD,A,t∂EA,t
∂EN,t
∂pD,A,t
,
i.e. the change in Non-Annex B emissions triggered by a price change of dirty goods,
which is triggered by a change in Annex B emissions.
Figure 6 shows the leakage elasticity, i.e. the change in Non Annex B GHG emissions
due to a price response triggered by a change in Annex B emissions for the case with and
without border carbon adjustment. Without BCA an one per cent reduction in Annex B
16Note that this adjustment of Annex B emissions makes our analysis different from other studies
about the efficiency of border measures, where the emission target is given and BCA are used to achieve
this target.
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Figure 5: Results of the BCA scenario. BCA leads to a decrease in GDP in the tariff
imposing Annex B region. The main goal of the import tariff is reached, since it forces
Non-Annex B to reduce emissions. It also improves the competitiveness of Annex B’s
carbon intensive industries and shifts production of those goods to A and clean goods
to N .
emissions raises Non-Annex B emissions through the leakage channnel from 0.1 to 0.35
per cent. Leakage is higher for later periods. If Annex B imposes a carbon tariff, leakage
becomes even negative. Now an one per cent reduction of Annex B emissions causes a
reduction in Non Annex B emissions in the range of 0.12 and 0.06 per cent. The border
measure does efficently reduce leakage.
As we argued above in section 2.4, the credibility of Annex B countries to imple-
ment BCA and to use it as a stick and force Non Annex B countries to GHG emission
reductions depends on the welfare effects of such a policy. The graph in the top left of
Figure 5 shows the change in Net GDP from imposing BCA compared to the baseline
scenario. The GDP in the Non-Annex B is almost not affected by the measure, while
the GDP in the Annex B decreases. The same holds for welfare: An examination of
the Equivalence Variation between the scenarios shows that the Annex B suffers small
welfare losses on 0.01 per cent of their income, whereas Non-Annex B profits from the
measure in Non-Annex B and gains 0.07 per cent income if the measure is introduced.
Imposing the import tariff is thus not a credible threat for the Non-Annex B countries.
Or in other words: The benefits from the better climate in the future do not cover the
costs due to the distortion of free trade. The reason for this negative welfare effect
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Figure 6: The leakage elasticity in Non-Annex B under the two scenarios with and
without border measures. The figure shows the price induced response of Non-Annex B
emissions to an one percent reduction in Annex B emissions.
becames clear after a closer inspection of effects on trade from BCA.
Figure 7 presents the main effects of Annex B’s BCA implementation on trade be-
tween both regions. The panel in the bottom left shows the markup from the BCA
on carbon-intensive dirty good imports from the Non-Annex B in Annex B. Carbon-
intensive imports from Non-Annex B become 3 percent more expensive. Since the emis-
sion price increases over the time horizon, the BCA and the markup raise as well up to
5 per cent in 2100. This allows Annex B producers to increase production capacities of
carbon intensive goods and hences pricees of D produced in Annex B slightly fall about
0.25 percent below the baseline level. Since the BCA only captures the domestic market,
there is almost no effect on prices of Non-Annex B carbon-goods net of tariff.
To analyze the effects of the import tariff on the net GDP in the two regions in more
detail, we concentrate on the production levels of the carbon-intensive good sector and
the clean good sector as well as on the import and export levels in figure 7. On the
top left of figure 7, the change in carbon-intensive good production due to the import
tariff is plotted. The panel in the top right of figure 7 illustrates the effects on net
exports induced by BCA. The Annex B countries decrease the net exports of the clean
good and increase the net exports of the carbon-intensive good. Note that the Annex B
countries are net exporter of carbon-intensive goods and net importer of the clean good
in the baseline scenario. Thus, BCA boosts the original ratios: The Annex B countries
concentrate their production and their exports even more on carbon-intensive goods
than in the baseline scenario. The Non-Annex B countries concentrate their production
and their exports on clean goods.
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Figure 7: Trade effects of the BCA. The implementation of carbon border measures
leads to a small reduction in prices for Annex B’s carbon intensive goods. Since Annex
B is a net exporter of this goods, the price decrease deteriorates terms of trade of Annex
B and hence welfare. For Non-Annex B the effects are vice versa.
But since Annex Bs carbon-intensive good prices fall, Terms of Trade are also de-
teriorated for Annex B and improved for Non Annex B as it is shown in the panel in
bottom right of figure 7. This small changes in Terms of Trade are responsible for the
welfare effects we observed above.
But as the sensitivty analysis has shown are the observed welfare effects are not con-
stant over the whole range of elasticities. A crucial role plays the Armington elasticitiy
for carbon-intensive goods, which determines the substitutability between domestic and
foreing goods.
Figure 8 shows exemplary the differences for a low and a high Armington elasticity
of substitution. Whereas for large elasticites, as in the case above, Annex B reacts on
the implemation of border measures with an increase in emissions, is the reaction in case
of low elasticies reversed. BCA leads to a more tighten climate policy in Annex B and to
almost no reaction of GHG emissions in Non-Annex B. Low elasticities allow Annex B
a better exploitation of their market power in the carbon-intensive sector and run short
the supply of the respective good. The border measure supports this strategy since it
makes it less attractive for Non-Annex B to expand production of dirty goods. Climate
and trade policies pull now both in the same direction. Under such a configuration the
implementation of border measures becomes welfare increaseing for Annex B.
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Figure 8: Effects of BCA on emissions and welfare for different Armington elasticities of
substitution for carbon-intensive goods.
5 Concluding Remarks
Climate policy must prove itself in an international environment. Besides the cross-
border externality of GHG emissions and the corresponding public good problem of
mitigation, an efficient climate policy has also to consider trade releated effects. We
show with a simple analytical model of non-cooperative optimal climate policy and
international trade at hand that unilateral emission abatement in one region has to cope
with leakage and that border carbon measures might reduces this problem.
But depending on trade patterns such a distorition of free trade has costs for the
imposing country. Using a modified version of the multiregional RICE model, which
especially captures international trade in goods and allows to choose unilateral optimal
climate policies, we are able to show that for realistic parameter assumptions levying bor-
der carbon adjustment in Annex B countries on Non-Annex B carbon-intensive imports
worsens welfare in Annex B countries.
Nevertheless, the analyis shows that for some parameter values, e.g. an explicit low
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign carbon-intensive goods, a BCA
introduction can be welfare improving, since it may allow Annex B region to exploit
market imperfections and generate rents.
Obviously the answer to the question if BCA is welfare improving depends on the
chosen baseline. If one assumes that the environmental policy regulator first decides
about the mitigation target and then is looking for instruments to enforce that target,
BCA is welfare improving with high certainty, since it is effective in reducing the leakage
problem and hence increases the effectivness of the own unilateral climate policy. If on
the other hand a region choses the optimal unilateral climate policy and takes leakage
and terms of trade effects already into account, then the welfare success of the additional
instrument depends not on its environmental policy efficency but rather on the power
of the tariff to exploit market imperfections.
Our paper shows that the implementation of border carbon measures had to be
chosen very carefully and has to consider all attendant circumstances, such as baseline
policy design and trade paterns.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof: The production possibility frontier is a concave function. The slope of the PPF
can be written as
∂Ci
∂E
∂E
∂ei
∂Di
∂ei
.
This is called the marginal rate of transformation (MRT). For the boundary point
Di = 0, the MRT is:
lim
ei→0
∂Ci
∂E
∂E
∂ei
∂Di
∂ei
= 0.
For the boundary point Ci = 0, the MRT is:
lim
ei→∞
∂Ci
∂E
∂E
∂ei
∂Di
∂ei
=∞.
Since Di(ei) and Ci(E(ei, ej)) are continuous and differentiable functions, the PPT,
which is a graph between the two boundary points, is a concave function. Therefore,
the production set is convex. 
A.2 Derivation of the Price Dependency of Emissions
The market clearing condition for the carbon-intensive good sector can be written as
follows:
HA(p,GD(p, eA, eN )) +HN (p,GN (p, eA, eN ))−DA(p, eA)−DN (p, eN ) = 0.
With the derivation rule of the implicit function theorem, we find that:
∂p
∂eA
=
−
(
∂HA
∂GA
∂GA
∂eA
+ ∂HN∂GN
∂GN
∂eN
− ∂DA∂eA
)
∂HA
∂p +
∂HN
∂p − ∂DA∂p − ∂DN∂p
.
Now, we introduce the income elasticity of demand τA, the price elasticity of demand
εA and the price elasticity of supply ηA of the Annex B as follows:
σA =
∂HA
∂GA
GA
HA
εA =
∂HA
∂p
p
HA
ηA =
∂DA
∂p
p
DA
.
Using this elasticities and assuming that σA = σN = σ, εA = εN = ε and ηA = ηN = η,
we get:
∂p
∂eA
=
∂DA
∂eA
− σ
(
∂GA
∂eA
HA
GA
+ ∂GN∂eA
HN
GN
)
(ε− η)(HA +HN ) .
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The terms HAGA and
HN
GN
denote the value share in the utility function of the carbon-
intensive good in the A and N , respective. Again, we assume that HAGA =
HN
GN
= θ. The
sum of demand HA + HN is equal to the sum of supply DA + DN and is equal to the
market size of the carbon-intensive good. We refer to the market size as Z and can
write:
∂p
∂eA
=
∂DA
∂eA
− σθ
(
∂GA
∂eA
+ ∂GN∂eA
)
(ε− η)Z .
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A.3 Damage Parameter in the RICE Model
Region α1 α2
United States -0.0026 0.0017
China -0.0041 0.0020
Japan -0.0042 0.0025
OECD Europe -0.0010 0.0049
Russia -0.0108 0.0033
India -0.0074 0.0049
Other High Income -0.0108 0.0037
High Income OPEC 0.0041 0.0015
Eastern Europe -0.0052 0.0019
Middle Income 0.0039 0.0013
Lower Middle Income 0.0022 0.0026
Africa 0.0157 0.0010
Low Income 0.0063 0.0025
Table 1: The 13 world regions in the RICE model and the corresponding damage pa-
rameter.
A.4 Damage Representation in the Numerical Model
In the analytical model in section 2, climate damages only affect the vulnerable goods in
the numerical representation. This assumption changes in the numerical model, climate
damages affect the GDP. We adopt the RICE damage approach by Nordhaus and Boyer
(2000). Nordhaus and Boyer use a quadratic damage function, which can be written as
follows:
Dt = α1 · T (t) + α2 · T (t)2. (18)
D(t) denotes the damage factor, T (t) is the temperature increase and α1 and α2
are damage parameters. For the 13 world regions in the RICE model, Nordhaus and
Boyer calibrate the values of α1 and α2, accounting for agricultural damages, Sea-level
rise, other vulnerable sectors, health concerns, non-market amenity impacts, human
settlements and ecosystem impacts and catastrophic events.17 Table 1 in the appendix
provides an overview of the 13 world regions in the RICE model and the corresponding
damage parameter.
For the IAM model used in this paper, we need to aggregate climate damages for
the two world regions Annex B and Non-Annex B. From the regions of the RICE model,
17Other vulnerable sectors in the RICE damage representation are the sectors forestry, energy, water
systems, construction, fisheries and outdoor recreation.
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Figure 9: Damage factor of the two regions Annex B and Non-Annex B in the numerical
model with a GDP weighted and a population weighted scheme.
the United States, Japan, OECD Europe, the Other High Income States, Russia and
Eastern Europe are in the Annex B group.18 China, India, Africa, the High Income
OPEC countries and the Middle, Low Middle and Low Income countries constitute the
Non-Annex B region of the model. We aggregate the impact functions in table 1, using
the two different weighting schemes motivated by Nordhaus and Boyer (2000): GDP
weights and population weights. The corresponding damage factor is illustrated on the
top (GDP weighted) and on the bottom of figure 9 (population weighted). In the GDP
weighted scheme, the damage parameter of the Annex B and Non-Annex B region looks
almost the same. But in the population weighted scheme, the Non-Annex B region is
more vulnerable than the Annex B region.
In order to receive a regional damage function which can be used as an input in
the model, we approximate the damage curves in figure 9 with a polynomial function
of factor 2. This way, we get a damage representation similar to the one of Nordhaus
and Boyer (2000), but for the two regions Annex B and Non-Annex B of the numerical
model. The damage function for the two regions Annex B and Non-Annex be can be
written as follows:
18Note that the United States are in the Annex B group in our model, simply because the relatively low
damages in the US combined with the large economic output distort the impact factor in the Non-Annex
B region.
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Dr,t = ar · T (t)2 + br · T (t) + 1, (19)
where ar and br are the damage parameter for the two regions of the model, estimated
with a polynomial approximation of factor 2. The outcome of this approximation can
be seen in table 2. Note that we use the population weighted damage representation for
the results in section 4.
Weighting Scheme Annex B Non-Annex B
ar br ar br
GDP weighted -0.0022 -0.0003 -0.0016 -0.0048
Population weighted -0.0023 0.0006 -0.0017 -0.0078
Table 2: Damage Parameter for the Annex B and Non-Annex B region in the numerical
model.
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A.5 Regional Aggregation in the Numerical Model
Model region Included database regions
Annex B Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Lux-
embourg, Malta, New Zealand, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Rest of North
America, Rest of EFTA, Rest of Europe.
Non-Annex B Albania, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, China, Central
America, Colombia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mada-
gascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Peru,
Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Tan-
zania, Thailand, Turkey, Tunisia, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Rest of Andean Pact, Rest of
Caribbean, Rest of East Asia, Rest of Former Soviet Union, Rest
of Middle East, Rest of North Africa, Rest of Oceania, Rest of
South Africa CU, Rest of SADC, Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa,
Rest of South America, Rest of FTAA, Rest of South and South
East Asia.
Table 3: Regional aggregation in the numerical model.
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A.6 Sectoral Aggregation in the Numerical Model
Model sector Included database sectors
Carbon-Intensive
Goods
Coal, Oil, Gas, Paper products, Publishing, Petroleum, Coal
Products, Chemical, Rubber, Plastic prods, Mineral products,
Motor vehicles, Transport equipment, Machinery, Manufactures,
Minerals, Electricity, Gas manufacture, distribution, Air Trans-
port.
Affected, Clean
Goods
Paddy Rice, Wheat, Cereal grains, Vegetables, Fruit, Nuts, Oil
Seeds, Sugar Cane, Plant-based fibers, Crops, Cattle, Sheep,
Goats, Horses, Animal Products, Raw milk, Wool, Silk-worm
cocoons, Forestry, Fishing, Meat, Vegetable oils and fats,
Dairy products, Processed rice, Sugar, Food products, Bever-
ages, Textiles, Wearings apparel, Leather products, Wood prod-
ucts,Electronic equipment, Water, Construction, Trade, Commu-
nication, Financial Services, Business Services, Public Adminis-
tration, Defence, Health, Education, Dwellings.
Table 4: Sectoral aggregation in the numerical model.
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A.7 Climate Sub-Model
The geophysical constraints and the climate sub model are identical to DICE (Nordhaus
1991). Emission accumulation and transportation is defined as:
Mt = 590 + β
∑
r
Er,t + (1− δM )(Mt−1 − 590), (20)
where Mt denotes atmospheric concentration of CO2, β is the marginal atmospheric
retention rate and δM is the carbon transfer rate to deep ocean.
Radiative forcing Ft (the increase of surface warming in Watts per m2) is a function
of CO2 and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere:
Ft = 4.1
(
log(Mt/590)
log(2)
)
+Ot, (21)
where Ot represents other greenhouse gases, which are taken as exogenous.
The links between radiative forcing and temperature changes in the atmosphere and
the deeper ocean are given as:
TEt = T
E
t−1 + c1[Ft−1 − c2TEt−1 − c3(TEt−1 − TLt−1], (22)
TLt = T
L
t−1 + c4(T
E
t−1 − TLt−1), (23)
where TEt is atmospheric temperature, T
L
t is the atmosphere in the lower oceans,
and c1, c2, c3, c4 are geophysical parameters of climate dynamics. Table 5 shows the
parameter values of the climate model.
Marginal atmospheric retention rate β .64
Carbon transfer rate to deep ocean δM .00803
Climate coefficient for upper level c1 .02059
Climate feedback coefficient c2 .0914974
Climate coefficient transfer c3 .03713
Climate coefficient transfer c4 .00198
Table 5: List of the climate parameters in the numerical model.
As in the paper of Bo¨hringer, Lo¨schel, and Rutherford (2007) the relationship be-
tween TEt and the climate state, which is a function of previous climate states and
emissions, is merged into a single equivalent equation Γt:
TEt = Γt(S0,
∑
r
Er,0,
∑
r
Er,1, ...,
∑
r
Er,t−1). (24)
The climate sensitivity, i.e. the gradient of temperature in period t to emissions in
period τ < t is:
νt,τ =
∂Γt(S0, Et)
∂Eτ
, (25)
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where Et =
∑
r Er,t.
Since the climate and the economic model are decomposed and have different time
horizons, we can express the atmospheric temperature as:
TEt ≈ T¯Et +
t∑
τ=0
νt,τ (Eτ − E¯t), (26)
where T¯Et is the reference value of temperature in period t, E¯t is the reference emis-
sions in period τ .
For an extensive discussion of the climate model and the decomposition between that
and the economic model refer to the paper of Bo¨hringer, Lo¨schel, and Rutherford (2007).
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A.8 Economic Parameters in the Numerical Model
Parameter Between Value
σQ Aggregate commodities to gross GDP 0.2
σKD Capital and labor in carbon-intensive goods 0.4
σKV Capital - Labor in carbon-intensive Goods 0.6
σOV KL - Intermediates in vulnerable Goods 0.7
σOD KL - Intermediates in carbon-intensive Goods 0.2
σAV Foreign - Domestic vulnerable Goods 4.66
σAD Foreign - Domestic carbon-intensive Goods 4.27
σ Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution 5
Table 6: List of the elasticity parameters in the numerical model.
Depreciation rate 5
Discount rate 2.5
Exogenous economic growth rates:
Annex B 1.5
Non-Annex B 2.5
Table 7: List of the fundamental parameters in the numerical model.
34
A.9 Emission Technology Parameters in the Numerical Model
The technological change regarding energy efficiency is exogenously given. The cumula-
tive improvement of energy efficiency is identical in both regions and defined as:
φCt =
φG
δT
(1− exp−δT (t−1)), (27)
where φG denotes the annual growth rate of energy efficiency and δT the decline in
the growth rate. The emission-output ratio φr,t is the defined as:
φr,t = φ0,r expφ
C
t , (28)
with φ0,r as the regional CO2-output ratio in 2010.
Parameter Description Value
φ0,r Base year CO2-output ratio
Annex B .49
Non Annex B 1.34
φG Annual growth of φt,r -.01234
δT Annual decline rate of technology .01049
φCt Cumulative improvement of energy efficiency
γ1 Intercept of the emission control function .0686
γ2 Exponent of emission control function 2.887
Table 8: List of the technology and emission parameter in the numerical model.
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A.10 Economic Equations in the Numerical Model
Most equations are identical to the equations of the model in Schenker (2009).
A.10.1 Variables and Prices
Yr,t Net output (consumption good)
Qr,t Gross output
Oi,r,t Output of commodity i
Ai,r,t Armington good out of sector i
INVr,t Investment in region r
Kr,t Capital stock in region r at time t
HHr Regional household r
Er,t CO2-equivalent emissions in billion tons
Dr,t Climate damages
Υr,t Emission control rate
ABr,t Abatement costs
Table 9: List of the activity levels in the numerical model.
pr,t Price Consumption Good (Net Output)
pqr,t Price Gross Output
poi,r,t Price commodity i
pai,r,t Price Armington i
pkr,t Purchase Price of Capital
rkr,t Rental Rate of Capital
wr,t Wage rate
pabr,t Shadow price on abatement cost coefficient
pdr,t Shadow price on damage coefficient
per,t Shadow price of emissions
Table 10: List of the price levels in the numerical model.
Note that Πi,r,t denotes the profit function of sector i in region r at time t. Differen-
tiating the profit function with respect to input and output prices provides compensated
demand and supply (Shepard’s lemma) which appears subsequently in the market clear-
ance condition.
A.10.2 Zero Profit Conditions
Zero profit condition for the consumption good:
ΠGDPr,t = p
q
r,t
Qr,t
1 +Dr,t
− pr,tYr,t = 0. (29)
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Zero profit condition for gross GDP:
ΠQr,t = p
q
r,t − (
∑
i
θi,rp
A(1−σq)
r,t )
1
1−σq − per,tφt(1−Υr,t)− pqr,tABr,t = 0. (30)
Zero profit condition for commodities:
ΠOi,r,t = p
O
i,r,t−
θOi,rp(1−σOi )r,t + (1− θOi,r) [θKLi,r rk(1−σKi )r,t + (1− θKLi,r )w1−σKir,t ] 1−σ
O
i
1−σK
i
 11−σOi = 0.
(31)
Zero profit condition for the Armington production of commodity i:
ΠAi,r,t = p
A
i,r,t −
(
θAi,rp
O(1−σAi )
i,r,t +
∑
s
θAMi,r,sp
O(1−σAi )
i,s,t
) 1
1−σA
i
= 0. (32)
Zero profit condition for the capital accumulation:
ΠKr,t = p
K
r,t − pKr,t+1(1− δ)− rkr,t = 0. (33)
Zero profit condition for investment:
ΠIr,t = pr,t − pKr,t+1 = 0. (34)
Zero profit condition for abatement:
ΠABr,t = p
ab
r,t + p
q
r,tQr,t = 0. (35)
Zero profit condition for the emission control rate Υr,t:
ΠΥr,t = p
e
r,tφt − pabr,tγ1rγ2rΥγ
2
r−1 = 0. (36)
Zero profit condition for emissions:
−per,t =
∑
t
pdr,t(2α
1
rT
E
t + α
2
r) +
∑
t>T
pdr,tχr,t, (37)
where χr,t denotes the climate impacts beyond the horizon of the economic model.
A.10.3 Market Clearance Conditions
Market clearance condition for the consumption good:
Yr,t = DIr,t + Cr,t + INVr,t. (38)
Market clearance condition for the gross output:
Qr,t(1−ABr,t)
1 +Dr,t
= Yr,t. (39)
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Market clearance condition for the output commodity i:
∂ΠAi,r,t
∂pOi,r,t
+
∑
s
∂ΠAi,s,t
∂pOi,r,t
= Oi,r,t, (40)
with
∂ΠAi,r,t
∂pOi,r,t
and
∂ΠAi,s,t
∂pOi,r,t
as domestic demand for commodity i and foreign demand in
region s for commodity i.
Market clearance condition for the Armington good i:
∂ΠQi,r,t
∂pAi,r,t
=
∂ΠAi,r,t
∂pAi,r,t
, (41)
with
∂ΠQi,r,t
∂pAi,r,t
as demand in gross output for Armington good i.
Market clearance condition for labor supply:
L¯r,t =
∑
i
∂Πi,r,t
∂wr,t
, (42)
with ∂Πi,r,t∂wr,t as demand for labor in sector i
Market clearance condition for investments and capital:
Kr,t−1(1− δ) + INVr,t−1 = Kr,t (43)
Market clearance condition for abatement costs ABr,t:
ABr,t = γ1rΥ
γ2r
r,t, (44)
where γ1r and γ
2
r are the parameters in the abatement cost function (see table 8 for
values).
Market clearance condition for emissions:
Er,t = φr,t(1−Υr,t)OD,r,t. (45)
Emissions Er,t are a function of the exogenous emission-output ratio φr,t, the emis-
sions control rate Υr,t, and the production of emission intensive goods OD,r,t.
A.10.4 Economic Impacts
The economic impact of climate change on the regional economies Dr,t is given by:
Dr,t = α1r(T
E
t )
2 + α2rT
E
t , (46)
where α1r and α
2
r are regional damage parameters (see table XX in the text) and Tt
describes the temperature at time t.
A.10.5 Household Income
HHr =
∑
t
wr,tL¯r,t + pkr,t=0Kr,t=0 (47)
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A.10.6 Terminal Capital Constraint∑
t
INVr,t
INVr,t−1
− Qr,t
Qr,t−1
= 0 ∀t > T (48)
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